نُشر في ميدل إيست آي – أبريل 2025
The years leading up to 2024, and especially the year itself, were marked by a diverse array of strategies aimed at countering non-state armed groups in the Middle East.
Some groups, such as those in the “axis of resistance”, faced US-led targeted efforts to weaken their military capabilities. Others experienced varying degrees of state support, as in post-Assad Syria, or found themselves integrated into evolving state structures, like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Still others, including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, engaged in political negotiations, as the group moved towards dissolving its military wing and participating in political life.
The “axis of resistance” – which includes Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas – suffered significant setbacks in 2024. For this loosely aligned network, the year marked a major contraction in its influence.
The declared goal of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza since late 2023 is to defeat Hamas. As a result of the devastating war, the group might emerge with drastically diminished military strength.
between Israel and Jordan – now makes regional infrastructure development highly improbable in the near term, as armed conflict continues to undermine economic cooperation.
The success of regional trade and energy corridors depends heavily on curbing the influence of armed groups. A stable, prosperous environment could, over time, diminish their appeal and capacity. Current instability threatens the viability of establishing such projects, which themselves could shape – and be shaped by – the dynamics of non-state armed actors.
Strategic vision
This US grand strategic vision serves as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As the US seeks to prevent China from securing a stable foothold in the Middle East, it is focusing on several distinct areas.
Firstly, it is confronting perceived threats. Non-state armed groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis are viewed as direct threats to US interests, its regional allies (especially Israel), and maritime security. Recent US actions against the Houthis reflect a broader campaign to degrade the military and political reach of such actors.
The US is focusing on supporting state authorities. Powerful non-state actors can erode the legitimacy of governments. By strengthening institutions, such as through the incorporation of the SDF into the Syrian military, the US aims to reinforce the state’s monopoly on violence.
Despite these concerted efforts, however, non-state armed groups are unlikely to disappear. The “axis of resistance”, though battered, remains resilient. Analysts who dismissed these groups might have underestimated their adaptability and decentralised strength.
Syria remains a volatile arena. The collapse of the Assad regime brought not peace, but rather a mosaic of competing actors jostling for influence, and an escalation of Israel’s attacks on the country. Sectarian clashes and military campaigns by the new government against Assad loyalists have highlighted the continuing relevance of armed factions.
In Gaza, the devastating Israeli military campaign may have weakened Hamas militarily, but failed to address the root causes of Palestinian resistance: Israel’s occupation. Popular support for Hamas and other factions will likely persist as long as Palestinian grievances remain unaddressed.
The Kurdish question remains unresolved. In Turkey, the detente between the PKK and the state is fragile, and previous efforts at peace have collapsed. In Syria, Kurdish aspirations – political, cultural and military – face significant barriers in negotiations over the country’s future.
While some armed groups might dissolve or be absorbed into state structures, the underlying drivers of militancy – occupation, sectarianism, marginalisation, foreign intervention and fragile statehood – remain deeply entrenched. Non-state armed groups, whether transformed or rebranded, will likely continue to shape the political and security dynamics of the region for years to come.